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### STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA, AND
GERMANY FOR POLAND'S SECURITY POLICY

BY

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Polish Armed Forces

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Dr. Robert Craig Nation Project Advisor

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#### ABSTRACT

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This research examines some aspects of the European security problem in the next fifteen years: the future position of Russia and Germany as major strategic players with focus on the mutual relationships between them and possible threats to Poland's security stemming from their increasing role as well as the implications for the US strategy in Europe. The analysis of future scenarios gives the picture of Germany as a country that consequently will transform its economic prosperity into political power within an increasing sphere of political, economic, and cultural dependence. Russia will play a decisively more important role and will try to restore its previous position as a world superpower. To neutralize such trends some determinants of Poland's security policy were defined to coincide with American and Polish interests in the region.

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### 1. INTRODUCTION

For many centuries the security and existence of the Polish nation were endangered by Russia and Germany. Nobody can exclude that in a proximate future, in spite of the revolutionary peaceful changes in Europe in the 1990s, some kind of encroachment from them may threaten Poland's security even if that encroachment is occasioned by economic dependence, a clash of civilizations or another nonmilitary factor.

This perception coincides with some very important implications that have a global strategy dimension. Germany and Russia are major European powers which will considerably shape the future of the continent within the next a dozen or so years. They will also interact each other as well as with other major strategic players such as the United States, Japan and China. Poland, as a medium European state, will be involved in this strategic game due to its disadvantageous geostrategic location. This is the reason why it has to shape very cautiously its security policy searching for good relations with both neighbors, Russia and Germany. But lessons learned from Poland's history dramatically reveal that this will not be a sufficient condition for the future prosperity of the state.

It is a dictate of the highest importance for Poland to select strategic allies having some national interests that are consistent with its own. It seems that among several possibilities including primarily collective security, with "axiomatic" membership in NATO and the EU, the most important role among individual states should have fallen to the United States. However an asymmetric factor must be taken into account due to the global engagement of the United States as a world superpower.

In this research an attempt is made to analyze future scenarios for Russia and Germany in the next fifteen years as well as the major possible threats to Poland's security stemming from these scenarios. Within the framework of this analysis main attention is devoted to the mutual relations between these major powers as well as implications for the United States. On the basis of this scrutiny some determinants of Poland's future security policy were defined to coincide with American and Polish interests in the region.

Also, three theses are discussed. The first argues that the future Russian threat to Poland is greater than the German one only in the short and medium term perspective. The second assumes that Russia will play a decisively more important role than that which results from its relatively weak current position. The third argues that Poland will become the strongest country among new emerging democracies at the turn of century and it will be the most reliable US ally after the UK in Europe. Besides it is taken for granted that in 1999 Poland will join NATO and in 2003 the EU. So the problem of NATO enlargement is not recognized here as the main one and is rather seen more as a strategic than political issue.

### 2. THE RUSSIAN QUESTION

### 2.1. THE ROADS TO A NEW RUSSIAN IDENTITY

Since its emergence in 1991 as the legal successor of the Soviet Union, Russia is still in the midst of a deep multidimensional crisis: political, economic, military, and social. An attempt to rebuild the former empire within the CIS and recent efforts to establish very close relations with Belarus, as well as the case of Chechnia, testify that internal and external crises will be managed parallel and independently. It seems that priority is being even given, at least by a consensus of elites, to territorial expansion at the expense of a consolidation of the economy and a modernization of the state.

From an objective point of view the domestic issues are more important in state crisis management. There is an optimistic message that in 1997 Russia will reach the "bottom" of an economic decline and will begin painfully to rebuild its economy in accordance with market rules. This process will depend largely on the political and social developments. In order to examine them , a short review of future scenarios is offered.

The first scenario is called Muddling Down (MD) and in fact is a simple extension of current reality. The prospects for the MD scenario are low: a few months to a few years. This scenario can be followed by the most optimistic

one, and the least probable, called Chudo (Miracle). It is relatively swift modernization and democratization of the state while keeping a balance between centralization and decentralization as well as authoritarianism and regionalism. The final stage of this scenario is Capitalism Russian-Style (CRS) which is supposed to be realized around 2010. The next scenario that would lead to the CRS is called the Two-Headed Eagle with a strong government, which faces both forward toward a market economy (but with state control) and backward toward the collectivist and industry-centered values of the past. Another optimistic scenario called Muddling Through is described as slowly movement from crisis to crisis along the road of gradual societal and economic modernization, avoiding civil war and fascist degeneration.

The Times of Troubles is a set of pessimistic scenarios including different stages of chaos. Extreme decentralization and strong regionalism are the main features in this period of time. The beginning for any stage can be political, economic or social disorder or unrest as well as any mixture of these. Chaos will not necessarily encompass the whole territory of Russia. In the mild chaos scenario -- the "Long Good-Bye" -- the regions are seen to drift separately. 11 Moscow loses control over the majority of state territory, specially over three regions: the Northwest (St. Petersburg), the Far East, and the so-called South Russian Confederation. The most pessimistic scenario is presented as the slide of parts of the former Soviet Union into a series of Yugoslav-style conflicts and civil wars and the further disintegration of the state. 12 The response to it is the Russian Bear scenario with its counterpart -- a military coup d'etat. 13

The end state for all of these scenarios is the CRS. It could bear many similarities to present-day Mexico, Turkey and even Italy. Capitalist Russia in 2010 will be developed irregularly, with a strong state sector and large "shadow economy", and ambivalent attitude toward the West. Unfortunately, the CRS is not the only possible end state. There is a danger of the restoration of the Soviet Union by a "red-brown" coalition with the use of force. Such a historical turn is still possible, if not on the whole

former Soviet territory then at least on a part of it. 16 It would be the worst possible scenario where the most painful and bloody social experiment in the history of the mankind leads into further poverty and calamities. The last attempt of the lower chamber of Russian parliament -- the State Duma -- to dismiss President Yeltsin could have led to such a development.

What is the future of Russia in terms of foreign policy as a product of domestic issues? There are three historical approaches: Atlantism, Eurasianism, and These approaches are still relevant while Nationalism. Russia is searching for its new identity and they are strictly connected with three alternatives : a liberal and Western-oriented society, a pan-Slavist and anti-Western as well as Asian-directed society, and a chauvinist and nationalist society led by a Red-Brown coalition. Within the Atlantist variant, the main factor in foreign policy is cooperative security, with priorities changing depending on perception of emerging threats. Enhanced rivalry with Germany (after the period of rapprochement) would be the long-term result. The other two models are not so neighborfriendly. The aim of Eurasianism is a resumption of imperial status. There is a special mission for Russia to serve as a bridge between West and East. The shift of the civilization center of gravity from the Europe-Atlantic region to the Pacific Rim is seen as a great advantage for Russia in spite of competition with China and Turkey. For the Red-Brown coalition there is no alternative to restoration of the Soviet empire. Foreign policy will be driven by expansionism and aggressive nationalism. In this case Japan and Germany could be the potential enemies in the future. It seems that in 2010 Russia's foreign policy will still straddle all these three options but Atlantism will be the strongest ramification.

### 2.2. THREATS TO POLAND

There are numerous Russian threats to Poland's security. They are different for each scenario. At present these are:

- -- Russian protest against the enlargement of NATO, which strikes Polish strategic interests by freezing a "gray zone",
- -- political threats, such as the threat to Belarus independence that make Poland more vulnerable to Russian imperial policy,
- -- economic threats such as the relatively large dependence on energy resources from Russia and the collapse of many Polish industrial branches having strong connections with former Soviet markets,
- -- military threats such as the big concentration of troops as well as Navy ships in the Kaliningrad District and the uncertainty of arms control regimes (CFE Treaty, Treaty on Open Skies, etc.),
- -- the export of criminal structures with related phenomena like the mafia, drug-trafficking, nuclear isotopes smuggling, stolen cars gangs, highway robbery, money washing, illegal employment, etc.,
- -- ecological threats -- for example the Chernobyl syndrome.

These threats may endanger Polish security also in the future but there are some which will occur only in the case of a chaos scenario: Balkanization or Lebanonization. The abovementioned threats will intensify while other, more dangerous threats will emerge: large-scale migration, stray troops, terrorism, etc. If Poland is not already a member of NATO such developments will speed up the enlargement process. Finally, one should mention the possibility of direct invasion or direct attack by Russian armed forces.

The majority of these threats are directed not only against Poland. Poland manages some of them with collective security instruments (UN, OSCE, NACC, PfP), some with regional (CE, CBSS, CEI, ECE) and bilateral cooperation with other countries (i.e., border sealing with German aid) or international organizations and agencies like CCC, IAEA, IFRCS, IOM, Interpol, OECD, NSG and ZC.

### 3. THE GERMAN QUESTION

### 3.1. THE FUTURE SCENARIO: APPRECIATION FOR ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS OF POWER

"Quo vadis a united Germany?" is one of the most frequently posed question within the debate on European security issues. The "German question" appeared somewhere in the 18th century and has been consistently valid with different degrees of intensity. The reunification of Germany in 1990 brought the intensity to its sequential maximum. The reason was twofold: historical -- each time the German state became a major power it initiated wars -- and contemporary, after reunification Germany became a significant power with all key determinants: economic, political, military, technology, population, territory and its location. So it is nothing strange that there is a great concern in Washington, Paris, London, and Warsaw to name just a few cases. 20 It also seems that there is no exaggeration in the statement that the circumstances which led to Nazism are anchored in national features and are still driving forces leading to its contemporary mutation Kohlism, with the exception of ethic issues. 21

Germany as well as another WW II loser -- Japan -- has understood first that economic strength has begun to replace military resources including nuclear capabilities as the certificate of international power. Due to this paradigm -- from economic power to political power -- having been constantly implemented by Germany, it is easy to foresee that its foreign and security policies will be mainly driven by economic policy. If one adds the experience of the international community with Realpolitik, a "German picture" becomes less foggy. The future Germany will be committed to neither West nor East, but will play both off against each other using its most efficient "weapon" -- the economy.

The process of the "deepening" of European integration will be replaced by the EU's enlargement as Germany ceases to be the driving force in this first option. This is due to the possibility of almost unlimited benefits deriving from cooperation between a strong German economy and the weak Central and Eastern European economies.

This process has some analogies with the period of colonization so it even may be called "modern economic quasi-colonialism".  $^{24}$ 

Germany will have good relations with the United States as long as it is in its interest or is accepted by the US. Sooner or later the United States will be substituted by Japan or China in pursuit of superpower status. So the American-German strategic partnership proposed by Hamilton could be a strategic mistake for the US. In the meantime Germany may change its approach to security issues. Possible options for German security policy in the future are:

- -- the sustainment of support for NATO,
- -- the "French option" within NATO,
- -- "Denmarkization" within NATO,
- -- integration with the WEU,
- -- the development of a pan-European security structure based on the OSCE,
- -- a neutral Germany,
- -- the "renationalization" of German defense policy and build-up of a nuclear capability.

It seems that parallel to the stronger and stronger economic position of Germany its security policy will evolve between different options according to German current national interests. There is even a premise to the conclusion that to secure its vital interest, that is free international trade, Germany may follow in America's footsteps in forward presence in the future.

This pessimistic scenario is not the only one possible. There are also many authors who suggest the peaceful integration of Germany into a secure European environment with positive co-leadership. But from a strategic point of view the United States and European countries should be prepared for negative developments.

### 3.2. THREATS TO POLAND

The history of Polish-German conflicts is as long as the history of Poland -- more than one thousand years. It is much longer than the history of Polish-Russian conflicts. In modern history Poland lost its independence twice due to Russian-German plotting. But before WW II it was the strategic genius of Marshal Pilsudski who foresaw that the main and more imminent threat was Germany, not the Soviet Union, in spite of common opinion to the contrary.

The contemporary European environment is remarkably different but there are many symptoms inside and outside Poland that may prove the viability of Pilsudski's thesis at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. The thoughtful observer can find some such symptoms in Germany:

- -- the strong and healthy economy that can be turned off the EU's rails,  $^{34}$
- -- more and more assertive foreign and security policy soon after economic successes,
- -- changing political and social opinions and feelings,  $^{\mbox{\scriptsize 36}}$
- -- the case of the former GDR, which has proved that Germans can easily subordinate themselves to any totalitarian authority -- with the exception of 1953, the GDR was the model socialist country,
- -- the biggest challenge to a united Germany is the process of the democratization of the Eastern Germans, who for a long time may influence the political life as voters in a non-democratic direction,
- -- the tendency to question the Polish-German border still exist in Germany, with the new dimension as the "last piece of Stalin's legacy",  $^{37}$
- -- a dangerous tightening of German-Russian relations,  $^{\mbox{\scriptsize 38}}$
- -- an economic and demographic "invasion" of the Kaliningrad District by Germans will sooner or later create a political trouble spot,
  - -- the persistence of strong anti-Polish feelings. <sup>40</sup> There are also some symptoms in Poland:
- -- unbalanced economic relations (strict protection of the German economy with simultaneous exploitation of weaknesses of the Polish economy),

- -- the illegal repurchase of private property (plots and houses) by substituted Polish citizens,
- -- using the practice of dumping for unfair advantage in order to get the local markets under control,
- -- overrepresentation of the German minority in the Polish Parliament,  $^{41}$
- -- recent attempts to deform Polish history by giving priority to Russian war crimes over German ones instead of balancing them.

In Poland it is politically incorrect to talk about the German threat. This should not be any surprise as Germany is recognized as Poland's best advocate in the West. The prevailing opinion in Poland says that after joining NATO and the EU, the country will be secured for ever. This may even be true in case of the Russian threat and if one understands "for ever" in terms of 5-10 years. So from the point of view of a long-term strategy Poland needs Strategic Advanced Warning and Control System (SAWACS). Such a system should inspire and coordinate the activity of all institutions dealing with security in long term perspectives without any prejudice. The current system has some serious disadvantages. The problem is that only a few countries have an effective SAWACS. And the paradox is that it is more needed for small and medium sized countries.

## 4. THE BIG TRINITY: THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA, AND GERMANY IN STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

### 4.1. RUSSIAN-GERMAN FUTURE RELATIONS

The space between contemporary Germany and Russia was under the dominance of one of these two countries almost uninterruptedly at least from the 18th century. Only after the major historic overthrows: WW I, WW II, and the Cold War did Central and Central-Eastern Europe remain an "ownerless land" for short periods. But only after WW I and the Cold War could the peoples inhabiting the region decide their future within existing political relationships. It seems that the period of the 1990s is a prelude to the next partition of the "sphere of influence" consisting of 18 states. Those countries which are able -- and considered acceptable -- to join NATO and the EU will be in a much

better position than those which are to remain in a Russian sphere of influence. But in spite of all inevitable costs of modernization they may pay an additional "ticket" price for riding the European "train". It could be an economic, cultural and political dependence on Germany.

Meanwhile Germany, like Russia and unlike the rest of the great powers, does not concentrate only on domestic issues but parallel and consequently develops its sphere of influence that includes Central and Eastern Europe (with less emphasis on Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria and with the exception of Belarus and Moldova). For the time being this sensitive division of influences is accepted by Russia as it is too weak to be more assertive and it prefers to compete with Germany rather than with the United States. Although Gorbachev's very sophisticated plan to eliminate the United States from the competition unconsciously contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia became a beneficiary of it.

In the light of the scenarios presented in the preceding paragraphs both Germany and Russia will cooperate closely, establishing friendly ties for at least 10 years. In that time Germany will build its economic empire and will transfer economic benefits into political instruments of power. Since the wrong decision of recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the assertiveness of Germany is growing rapidly and will have a negative impact on European integration. In the interim Russia will painfully and patiently rebuild its position as a world superpower. It will swing among extreme scenarios with a prevalence of authoritarian patterns including the Red-Brown coalition and military coup unless it gains the Capitalism Russian-Style in 15 years at least.

Taking into account previous deliberations it seems that both Germany and Russia have strong offensive elements in their strategic planning. Along with SAWACS, they have historically developed also SAPACS (Strategic Advanced Planning (for) Ahead Checking Spheres) if the American-military mannerism for acronyms could be applied here. It seems that it is of less importance if SAWACS and SAPACS have governmental or institutional anchorage that would of course be the most profitable option. With a high level of probability one can state that both countries, being in a new strategic position since the historic turns in 1990 and 1991, are effectively developing SAWACS&SAPACS

ideas -- at least in the minds of political and economic elites as well as among strategic think tank associates. The main conclusion is that the increasing rapprochement between Germany and Russia will undercut and as a consequence substitute American supremacy -- at least in Europe -- in the next 15 years if no very serious countermeasures are undertaken.

### 4.2. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the international communities have had to cope with a radically different situation within the framework of security issues. The United States, as the only remaining superpower, but not the only or even the main winner (in fact it is Germany), still has a problem with the identification of a new security space. There are too many voices proclaiming that Russia will not be a significant threat to the United States in the foreseeable future. It seems that such prognoses arrive at a cul-de-sac, assuming the major future threats to lie in Asia or elsewhere. It may be true but they are neither main nor imminent ones. To the contrary the Russian threat to the US has not diminished yet at all. There are some main premises that lead to such a conclusion:

- -- Russia still perceives itself as a superpower which doesn't recognize internal crises as a pretext to be treated as a major power only,
- -- Russia possesses strong nuclear capabilities as well as the largest conventional armed forces in Europe, 48
- -- the second Cold War scenario is quite plausible in the case of ethnic clashes as well as other pessimistic surprises,  $^{49}$
- -- Russia's ability to cope with scientific and technological challenges,  $^{\rm 50}$
- -- Russia has enormous reserves to restore its superpower capabilities relatively quickly. 51

The last point is very important in considering the issue of emerging superpowers. Such countries as China, India, and Indonesia are not able to fill the civilization gap so quickly as Russia can restore its status. Furthermore, the prospects for economic recovery are not so

pessimistic in comparison with other emerging superpowers. The "national efficiency factor" is 4,6 for the US, 3,9 for Japan, 3,1 for Germany, 0,9 for Russia, 0,6 for Indonesia, 0,5 for China, and 0,25 for India. The last but not least argument is the example of Chinese and Chilean economic growth under authoritarian systems in contrast to a "democracy first, economic development later" paradigm.

What can be done to diminish the Russian threat, if not to transform it into friendly relations? The outcome of internal political struggles over Russian identity strongly depends on the policies of foreign powers. Russia needs foreign aid in its double transition: from authoritarianism to democracy and from a centrally commanded economy to a free market system. Such aid should be understood in a very broad sense. In general terms it can provide a counterbalance to German eastward expansionism. In security terms it can be a "soothing" factor for social unrest and can contribute to arms control. In civilization terms we can speak of a sharing of experience in culture and in education. If such assistance is perceived as a shortterm "investment" it is not astonishing that its effectiveness does not satisfy politicians. 55 But if it is treated as long-term investment it is the cheapest way to secure world peace. The very recent decision announced by President Clinton at the Helsinki Summit on 21 March 1997 to expand economic cooperation with Russia will profit not only security affairs (as a "Helsinki'97" packet) but also the economic well-being of both countries.

The basic challenge for further deliberations is to find factors that could lead to a major crisis in US-German relations. It seems that the main one is a wide-spread feeling of lack of sovereignty within German society due to the stationing of US forces. The second one is German expansionism that creates a lot of related problems. It will lead to US-German differences over policy toward Russia as well as Central and Eastern Europe, and controversy over security and trade issues. These differences are not articulated very clearly yet, but there is an old, tested Prussian school of diplomacy to play the game with other pieces. The most recent example is France, where it is the time for Germany to take an initiative on its account.

One of the most effective ways to protect Europe against German domination is to tighten the Euro-Atlantic alliance by the strengthening and enlargement of NATO as well as to amalgamate the EU and NAFTA. So the old truth formulated by Lord Ismay, the first secretary-general of NATO, that "the organization had three tasks: to keep the Americans in, to keep the Russians out, and to keep the Germans down" is still relevant. 57 But this time it is not a one way street as it was after WW II when the security of Europe to some extent was covered by American tax-payers. It was covered too long and cost too much, contributing to domestic problems in the US and helping the German (as well as Japanese) economies to flourish. However without the visionary decision of president Reagan on the SDI in the early 1980s supposedly the Soviet Union would still be alive.

But today the benefits are mutual: in trade and investment on a huge scale, in cooperation in response to global problems, in fostering common values and cultures. Besides this multilane highway there is an eastward bridge for the US to Russia and the Middle East. Through this bridge the US is able to steer great-power rivalry not only in Europe (e.g., Germany versus Russia) but elsewhere (e.g., to keep Turkey down), and to ensure that no aspiring regional hegemony arises.

### 5. POLAND'S SECURITY POLICY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND GERMANY

In 1989 once again history gave Poles the chance to build a prosperous country in the center of Europe. It is not true that such a location must create a disadvantage. But it is true that such a location requires diplomacy, discernment and far-sightedness. And it is also true that if any disadvantage does exist it could also be changed into advantage.

Assuming an untroubled course toward membership in the Western alliances the main imperative in Polish security policy is to build friendly relations with Russia. It must be a foundation of its Eastern policy. Although it is Russia's duty to initiate reconciliation with Poland as if it was in the case of Germany, some political signals of

reconciliation could be sent to Moscow to start the process of normalization. <sup>58</sup> In security terms Poland must be prepared to counteract any threat described earlier. But at the same time any Russian nationalistic forces should not be provoked by inconsiderate support to internal opposition as, for example, in the case of the Free Caucasus radio in Cracow. Poland has moral obligations to behave in this manner, but due to Russia's position as a major power provocative gestures are also contrary to reason of State as well as to Poland's obligation as a NATO member-to-be. It must be remembered that the lack of an asymmetric policy toward major powers before WW II was the main strategic mistake of the reborn Polish state. Such an attitude does not mean that cooperation with the Russian democratic movement must cease altogether. But targeting vulnerable national trouble spots is the last thing to do in the interest of stable bilateral relations.

From a historical point of view Poland was always a kind of laboratory for the USSR, even during the Brezhnev era, in terms of its wide spectrum of social and economic reforms. Although all these reforms collapsed, such a perception of Poland has been strengthened as it is successfully muddling through to full democracy and a free market economy. Examples are numerous "Russian" bazaars including the biggest "open" mall in the world at Warsaw's stadium and another under construction on the intersection of planned highways (France-Russia and Sweden-Italy).

The second pillar of Poland's Eastern policy -- inseparable from the first one -- create the relationships with Ukraine. In this case it is Poland that should clearly initiate the process of reconciliation as it was in the case of Germany toward Poland. The comprehensive cooperation is to be focused on economic fundamentals of the young Ukrainian state to make it economically independent from Russia.

Poland's security policy toward Germany should be focused on the potential long-term threat stemming from German expansionism. In spite of very good current relations each such symptom, even the smallest one, must be analyzed from the perspective of its far-reaching consequences in order to prepare strategic plans for appropriate counteraction. Such plans ought to include both internal and external economic and political instruments. Poland should

enter -- or build -- informal coalitions that aim to contain possible German hegemony before it is too late. It could be done within the framework of existing international organizations as well as in bilateral or multilateral cooperation with other concerned states. It seems that right reason calls for Poland to be increasingly assertive in regard to Germany as well as to initiate the disengagement of all links having any future implications for sovereignty. These links should be substituted for proper relations with other countries like the US, the UK, France and Italy. But all other links with Germany should be cherished to build and strengthen -- for the first time in history -- friendly and good-neighborly relations.

# 6. THE CROSSROADS OF THE US STRATEGIC GOALS IN EUROPE WITH POLAND'S NATIONAL INTERESTS

If the developments outlined earlier in Russia and Germany become reality in the next fifteen years the survival and vital US interests such as defense of the homeland, economic well-being, favorable world order and promotion of values will be endangered. But it seems that there is still time to counteract these negative trends through stronger cooperation with other European players. 62

There are two other "pieces" in this strategic game: the UK and France as well as one "pawn": Poland. Why is Poland so important for the US in this case? First, it is in Poland's own national interest to be dominated neither by Germany nor by Russia in the future. This matches the US goal in Europe to constrain the role of Germany and Russia as major powers. Second, no other country, among the prospective candidates for this role, matches the potential strategic significance of Poland in terms of geostrategic location, population, size and economy taken together. The more detailed advantages of Poland are:

- -- Poland has more potential than any other country in Central and Eastern Europe to emerge as an important middle power at the beginning of the next century,
- -- Poland's economy is the largest among the former COMECON states (except Russia) and is growing by 5-7 per cent per year,

- -- in Poland one finds particularly strong pro-American feelings,  $^{\rm 64}$
- -- Poland's population is going to grow as well as to be younger in comparison with other European countries,
- -- Poland has no border claims nor minorities conflicts,
- -- last but not least there is a large Polish minority in the US (according to the census of 1991 approximately 10 million Americans have Polish descent).

All these advantages create the high potential for Poland to be a bridge between West and East rather than to be a bulwark of the West against the East. It should be the bridge through which Western ideas, values, and principles in supporting democracy, advancing free markets, and encountering new security challenges are enriched by Polish experiences (and thus made more intelligible for other Slavs) and spread throughout Eastern Europe.

As it relates to American-Russian relations Poland may play a modest but special role. Apart from uniquely bilateral nuclear issues Poland may support all other problems with the same efficiency as the US's NATO allies did during the Cold War. At the same time Poland could play a certain role in containment of German economic power by engaging in a coalition of interested countries. Generally, Poland is interested in all American initiatives that weaken the potential for German hegemony in Europe in all dimensions as well as to prohibit a revival of Russian military power and imperialist ambitions. Poland may also take some independent initiatives like:

- -- support the idea of the nuclear free zone,
- $^{\rm --}$  decrease the manpower and armaments of its armed forces in accordance with the requirements of new arms control initiatives,  $^{\rm 68}$
- -- invite some the US organizations and institutions stationed in Europe or CONUS until now (e.g. OSIA-Europe) to establish offices in Poland (which is closer to areas of operation and where costs of living are much cheaper),
- -- establish cooperation with the US agencies and institutions engaged in promoting democratic and market reforms in the former Soviet Union.

In the light of these arguments it seems that it is worth reconsidering some assumptions of the policy towards Russia having been implemented till now

independently of the reminder of Central and Eastern Europe. The abovementioned Polish trumps as well as additional ones like leadership in reforms, common history and experiences, and a good knowledge of Russian mentality and culture may strengthen some US initiatives.

### 7. RECAPITULATION

"Ideas and the ability to generate them seem increasingly likely, in fact, to be more important than weapons, economic potential, diplomatic acumen, or technological advantage in determining who exercises global leadership and enjoys superpower status." There is no exaggeration in this statement. It simply means that apart from recognized determinants of power: natural, military, economic, diplomatic, political, psychological, and informational, an important place should also be allocated for strategic thinking. And it must also be adopted by small and medium sized countries. In the case of Poland it may be a development of the idea of SAWACS -- Strategic Advanced Warning and Control System. It would be an institution called for instance the "National Strategic Center" subordinated directly to the President and equipped with legal power to coordinate efforts of all analytic centers dispersed in different ministries, central institutions, governmental and non-governmental organizations, universities and institutes.

The most urgent task for such a center -- even in the phase of setting up -- is to elaborate long-term strategy with special emphasis on Russia and Ukraine as well as toward Germany. The first one must take into account not only the "NATO umbrella" but promote the active role of Poland in diminishing the negative factors connected with the expansion of NATO. The second one should be based on the very discerning and vigilant observations and analyses of all aspects of rising German hegemony with the economic and diplomatic factors at the top. Each such symptom must be investigated by comprehensive simulations to find the most appropriate countermeasures to be applied immediately.

To avoid the repetition of history, both strategic directions must be supported with reliable alliance in

addition to the Western and pan-European collective security arrangements. As was demonstrated in the previous paragraphs that there is only one option: the United States. But even if Poland successfully overcomes all obstacles in its march towards democracy and economic prosperity, including the present political division of society together with elites, and becomes a middle level European power by the turn of century, it should be remembered that the ally is a superpower. And even highly appreciating a very kind phrase expressed by President William J. Clinton while addressing the Polish Parliament it must be the axiom of the Polish security policy to match the Polish national interests to the US ones and not vice versa. Such strategic approach will strengthen nation's endeavors in the search for security whilst being sandwiched between Russia and Germany. As it was noticed by Roman Dmowski -- an outstanding pre-WWII Polish politician -- only a strong state would prosper at such geostrategic location. And this observation is still relevant on the eve of the twenty-first century.

#### **ENDNOTES**

Zbigniew Brzezinski has mentioned these dates in his statement during the international conference held in Brussels. See Zycie Warszawy, 24 February 1997, <a href="http://www.zw.com.pl/1997/970224/">http://www.zw.com.pl/1997/970224/</a>, (in Polish).

The letter from President Yeltsin to President Lukashenko on possible reunification of Russia and Belarus in Zycie Warszawy, 14 January 1997, <a href="http://www.zw.com.pl/1997/970114">http://www.zw.com.pl/1997/970114</a>, (in Polish).

Grzegorz Gromadzki and Edward Krzemien, "Glimmer in a tunnel" -- an interview with Marek Dabrowski former deputy minister of finance of the Polish government in 1989-1990, adviser to the Russian government in 1991-1994 -- Gazeta Wyborcza, 14-15 December 1996: 17-19, (in Polish).

Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, <u>Russia 2010</u> and What It Means for the World (New York: Random House, 1993).

Jbid., 119. There are some condition for the MD viability: maintaining the precarious balance between political forces (including extremist wings), avoiding a total economic collapse (modest transfer of property and capital in private hands), controlling social unrests (due to unemployment and low standards of living), preventing governmental paralysis and major conflicts along Russia borders.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 158. <sup>7</sup>Ibid., 177.

Bid., 132. The government has strong public support from society which seeks an alternative to poor standards of living, crime, corruption, inflation, and disorder. The development of privatization and marketization is modest with strong state control.

Neil Malcom, ed., <u>Russia and Europe: An End to Confrontation?</u> (London: Pinter Publishers for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), in chapter 10 "Russia and Europe: Possibilities for the Future" by Sergei Karaganov, 225.

Yergin, 141. The basic catalysts for the Times of Trouble can be: unemployment and radicalization and

politicization of trade unions, ethnic conflicts inside or outside Russia, or the attraction to extremism of large groups of society under charismatic leadership. The precedents are Polish patterns from 1980-1981 or 1988-1989 of Solidarity movement.

Ibid., 145. Apart from the scenario this has also begun to become reality, see in "Will a Neva Territory Appear on the Map?", <u>The Current Digest</u>, XLVIII, no. 38, (1996): 16.

<sup>12</sup>Malcom, 228.

Yergin, 153. The power is taken by a small junta led by Gen Nikolaev -- Gen Lebed in reality -- in some way similar to the Polish Marshal Law of 13 December 1981. See also Malcom, 226-228. In fact there are two different scenarios: a "red-brown" political coup and a revolt organized by underpaid and demoralized army.

 $^{1\bar{4}}$  Ibid., 184.

<sup>15</sup>Malcom, 227.

Soviet Analysts, An Intelligence Commentary, 24, no.2, (December 1996): 4. See also "Will the Soviet Union Be Reborn in 2005?" a policy paper prepared in 1995 for Russian president Boris Yeltsin, <a href="Harper's Magazine">Harper's Magazine</a>, July 1996, 19-20.

<sup>17</sup> Zycie Warszawy, 22 January 1997, <a href="http://www.zw.com.pl/1997/970122/">http://www.zw.com.pl/1997/970122/</a>> (in Polish).

Celeste A. Wallander, ed., <u>The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War</u> (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) in Chapter 6 "Russia and Europe After the Cold War: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy" by Bruce D. Porter.

Gen. Igor Rodionov in the interview for the Russian newspaper "Niezawisimaja Gazieta" said: "...Russia would target its nuclear missile at some European countries as they join NATO but specially if atomic weapons is deployed on their territories...", in Zycie Warszawy, 29 November 1996, <a href="http://www.zw.com.pl/1996/961129/">http://www.zw.com.pl/1996/961129/</a> (in Polish). The arguments for such developments are given in a very interesting way by Ernest W. Lefever, "Ominous Parallels, Germany in the 1920s and Russia Today", The American Enterprise, July/August 1996, 56.

Arnulf Baring, ed., <u>Germany's New Position in Europe</u>, (Oxford/Providence: Berg Publishers, 1994), 22. See also Josef Janning, "A German Europe -- a European Germany? On the Debate over Germany's Foreign Policy", <u>International Affairs</u>, 72, no. 1 (January 1996): 33-41.

Petronella Wyatt, "Some words of advice about Germany from beyond the grave", <u>The Spectator</u>, 8 June 1996, 29. This is a very interesting parallel of the pre-WW I and post-Cold War Germany with an apt characteristics of the Germans.

Gregory F. Treventon, America, Germany, and the Future of Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 175. See also Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, "Germany in the European Union: gentle giant or emergent leader?", International Affairs, 72, no. 1 (1996): 9-32.

There are some supportive arguments in Baring, 111-126, including the statement (p. 116) that "...... implementation of the Maastricht Treaty looks exceedingly unlikely in the near future, it will certainly be argued that in order to protect German industry, implementation ought be postponed indefinitely".

Treventon, 200. "Territories adjacent to Germany, especially the former German ones, will wind up bearing the same relation to Germany as Northern Mexico does to the United States -- independent in sovereignty but in practice of a piece with the German economy".

Andrew Gimson, "The Lure of the West", <u>The Spectator</u>, 28 September 1996, 16-18. There is a very first presage: "...according to figures published in July (1996) by the Bundesbank, that German trade with eastern Europe has overtaken German trade with the United States".

Daniel S. Hamilton, <u>Beyond Bonn</u>, <u>America & the Berlin Republic</u>, (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), 35. The same conclusion is also relevant to calls for German leadership that "...have come not only from President Clinton but also, within the EU, from the Dutch. The Visegrad countries are likely to attribute a leading role to Germany through their own diplomacy" -- in Bulmer and Paterson, 30.

Virgil G. Baleanu, <u>The "German Ouestion" and its</u>

<u>Present Strategic Implications</u>, (Camberley, the UK: Conflict

Studies Research Center, The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 1994), 9.

Craig R. Whitney, "France and Germany to Discuss Joint Nuclear Deterrent", New York Times, 25 January 1997, sec. A, p. 3, col. 1. The subtitle instead of comment: "A shift for countries that have relied on the Americans". See also Henry van Loon " "Inseparable" Security Interests", Armed Forces Journal International, March 1997, 14.

Ronald D. Asmus, <u>Germany's Geopolitical</u>

<u>Maturation</u>, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 48. This is very vague issue as a national debate on foreign and security policy priorities and options has remained largely taboo in Germany.

Gerd Langguth, <u>In Search of Security A Socio-Psychological Portrait of Today's Germany</u>, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995), 118. As it was precised by Helmut Kohl in 1993 "Germany vital interests can generally be defined as follows:

- -- to maintain its territorial integrity and to establish democracy firmly in Germany as a whole,
- -- to protect Germany from external pressures that pose a threat to its security,
- -- to secure free international trade, since Germany prosperity is highly dependent on exports".

Balneau, 3. The author says: "...talk of a "Fourth Reich" is needlessly offensive and ignorantly superficial ...". There are four arguments to support the thesis:

- -- the power of a united Germany will not be concentrated but split at local level,
- -- Germany is integrated into both the European Union and NATO,
- -- the rise of transnational corporations means that economic power is diffused outwards,
- -- the political culture and social structure of contemporary Germany is quite different from what it was in the first half of the century.

Norman Davies, <u>God's Playground</u>, <u>A History of Poland</u>, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1984). The first German-Polish conflict took place in the second half of the tenth century. The first major conflict between Russia and Poland happened in the 17th century when Poland's power started to decrease while Russian power was emerging in

western direction. Poland was the only country (in Russia's history) whose troops, led by Crown Hetman Zolkiewski, seized and occupied Moscow (from 27 August 1610 till 22 October 1612). The Russian-German plots against Poland: the Partition in 1795 (with Austria) and pact Ribbentrop-Molotov in 1939.

Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, <u>PILSUDSKI: A life for</u> Poland, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1982), 281, 371. "Germany resolves to pursue its interests", The

Economist, 13 July 1996, 45-46.

Baring, 122. The author says: "It is difficult to imagine that Germany, a key European but non-nuclear power, would allow its security policy to be dictated for an indefinite period by France and Britain, countries with weaker economies and weaker positions when compared to Russia".

Asmus 32, 38. Majorities of Germans consider Germany as the best-equipped country to play the leadership role in the EU as well as the best in an array of categories: economic performance, individual freedom, social justice, technology, culture. This should be questioned because it is near the same as what was said by Hitler to the German nation and what made the Nazi's genocide "legal".

Treverton, 199.

Gunther Hellman, "Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany", Mershon International Studies Review, 40, 1996, 21-22. There are two milder versions of "World Power" grand strategy: the "partnership in leadership" with the United States and the "Moscow first". Although the latter one finds less support in an academic dimension, in a current politics both approaches are balanced now.

Priit J. Vesilind, "Kaliningrad coping with a German past and a Russian future", National Geographic, March 1997, 115. "The oblast officially list some 5,000 ethnic German residents, but other estimates run as high as 20,000."

Asmus, 14. German sympathy toward Poles is much less than toward Japanese, Russians, and even Turks.

The minority population (estimates) versus the number of parliamentarian representatives: German (300,000/5), Ukrainian (300,000/0), Belarusian (250,000/1), Lithuanian (30,000/0), Czecho-Slovakian (30,000/0), Jewish (15,000/0), Russian (15,000/0).

Report on the security of the state, (Warsaw: National Security Bureau, 1995, 86-89, in Polish). See also Report on the security of the state, (Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 1995, 22-26, in Polish).

Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Albania.

Andrew Cowley, <u>The Economist</u>, 8 April 1995, S3-S5. "... Russia now has markets to send signals. The basic institutions of market economy have appeared with astonishing speed."

Here it is worthy to mention why so many western analysts are confused about political or social events in Russia. It is due to some factors that are not taken sufficiently seriously: the specific Russian "soul", the extreme hardiness of Russian society in the face of very poor life conditions, a different system of values and desires, and last but not least the strong imperial aspiration of the Russian nation manifested through centuries. From the above arguments it is evident that Huntington is near right with his theory of the "Clash of Civilizations".

A mindful reader of "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" of 1996 also may draw such conclusions, if he compares amount of spaces devoted to different regions of the world. However elsewhere may mean the US itself as it was argued by Anthony H. Cordesman in his speech to the US Army War College on 14 November 1996 (distributed also in a written form -- copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, 11/14/96).

Richard F. Staar, "Moscow Plans to Restore its Power", Orbis, Summer 1996, 377.

The superiority of the US most modern technology can not be taken too much for granted if Russia decides to explode powerful thermonuclear bomb in atmosphere to destroy the very sophisticated C4I American systems. It could be scenario for a breakdown of the would-be second Cold War.

<sup>49</sup> Yergin, 189-206.

As an example the breakdown in thermonuclear fusion experiments may be given. Thermonuclear fusion (of deuterium and tritium) is the only alternative to oil as an industrial source of energy in the 21st century. Until now there is no strategic interests of the United States (excuse for forward presence in some "oil" areas) as well as Russia (economy dependence on oil export) to invest money in this capitol-intensive field of science on the same scale as it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Such decision will allow both countries to maximize or to deprive the adversary strategic advantages of oil issue far beyond 2010. For the time being they near withdrew themselves from the cooperative efforts in this area. See Andrew Lawler "US Power Outage Won't Dim ITER", Science, 271, 19 January 1996, 282.

Yergin, 169: "...Russia also has some distinct advantages on which a Chudo can be built:

- -- excess capacity of many raw and semi-processed materials,
- -- abundant and low-wage scientific and engineering personnel, trained and literate industrial manpower,
- -- excess capacity in many industrial plants, pipelines, railroads, etc., some of which capitol stock is new and relatively efficient,
- -- unexploited managerial energy and talent,
- -- enormous pent-up demand for consumer goods and services, once personal disposable incomes rise to pay for them".

The "national efficiency factor" is a ratio of two magnitudes: national share of Gross World Product to national share of the world's population. The factors were calculated on the basis of data given in <a href="The World Fact Book 1995">The World Fact Book 1995</a>, (Washington, DC: CIA, 1995).

It is a controversial thesis presented in note 4 (p. 210) that one dimension should be added to Russia's transition, namely from imperial to postimperial state. As long as the laws of nations to self-determination and independence are complied with, such recommendation is a symptom of centro-Americanism's perception of the world's affairs.

Yergin, 262. Turkey has brought several thousand students from the former Central Asian republics to study in Turkish universities -- this is more than the total number of Russians in American universities.

<u>Strategic Assessment 1996</u>, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), 59-60.

Data presented by Asmus in note 29 don't entirely vindicate such conclusion but only seemingly. In 1994 62% of Germans opted for complete withdrawal or further reduction of US presence. The main reason why 33% Germans opted for sustaining the US presence at the same level -- from my personal observation -- is that they were driven by worries about unemployment following the close down of the US installations. But there is more serious signal I've got in personal contacts with Germans in the early 1990s. They described their feelings towards Americans' presence in the context of Poles' feelings toward Soviet troops' presence on Polish soil as being occupied by hostile power. Such comparisons are shocking but true.

Vladimir Baranovsky and Hans-Joachim Spanger, eds., <u>In from the Cold Germany</u>, <u>Russia</u>, <u>and the Future of Europe</u>, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), 200. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A plan for Europe", <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, January/February 1995, 29-32.

Adrian Hyde-Price, <u>The international politics of East Central Europe</u>, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), 153-154.

Masha Gessen, "Same Frequency", The New Republic, 4 September 1995, 12.

Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, "Building Poland's Security: Membership of NATO a Key Objective", NATO Review, May 1996, 7. "We strive for good neighborly relations with Russia -- similar to those which we have recently developed with Germany. We are eager to expand economic cooperation which would be in the interest of both countries. The friendly reception given to small traders who regularly visit our country from the East testifies that the Poles harbor no enmity towards the Russians."

For more arguments see the second position in note 42 (p. 21). For the very concise recapitulation of Polish-Ukrainian relations see note 58 (p. 157-160).

Such approach -- a mixture of unilateralism and multilateralism -- has as many advocates as protagonists, e.g.: Benjamin Schwarz, "Why America Thinks It Has to Run the World", The Atlantic Monthly, June 1996, 92-102.

Directorate of Intelligence, <u>Handbook of</u>
<u>International Economics Statistics 1996</u>, CPAS 96-10003,
September 1996.

It seems that the Czech Republics and Hungary definitely navigate towards Germany, Romania towards France, the Baltic's Republics towards Scandinavia and Germany, and Bulgaria hesitates between Germany and Russia.

Langguth, 205. Compare the German problem of social aging with demographic data as well as other prospects for Poland in "Poland and NATO", National Review, June 1996 by David D. Hale and Anna Hejka-Arczynska.

See some interesting comments in Sherman W. Garnett, "Poland: Bulwark or Bridge?", Foreign Policy, Spring 1996, 66-82.

The first Polish such initiative was announced as so-called "Rapacki Plan" in 1956.

The current manpower of 250,000 (including the Navy) could be decreased to 180,000 according to the concept prepared by late minister Jerzy Milewski, the Director of the National Security Bureau.

The interview of President William J.Clinton granted Tomasz Lis of Polish Television: "So we have a good, broad-based relationship with Russia. But we have to pursue independently our relationships with Poland, with Central and Eastern Europe." See Administration of William J. Clinton, 4 July 1994, 1410. The recent decision to expand NATO is a milestone but not a desired end state in the US-Central European countries relations.

Gregory D. Foster, "Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist", Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1996, 111. Quotation continued: "Thus it is imperative to develop, nurture, and engage strategic thinkers at all levels -- critical, creative, broad-gauged visionaries with the intellect to dissect the status quo, grasp the big picture, discern important relationships among events, generate imaginative possibilities for action, and operate easily in the conceptual realm."

These negative factors are specified in: Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace -- The Case Against NATO Expansion", Foreign Affairs, 73, no.3, May/June 1995, 9-13. See also Jonathan Dean, "No NATO Expansion Now", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1996, 18-19.

President Clinton said: "I have learned another Polish phrase which, even in my tortured accent, well describes our goal for a more secure, democratic, and

prosperous Poland: Rowni z rownymi, wolni z wolnymi, "Equal among equals, free with the free." It is time to bring that phrase to life." Administration of William J. Clinton, 7 July 1994, 1433.

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